Major League Baseball and the Green Revolution: A Market-Based Approach to Maintaining Competitive Balance in the Face of Environmental Regulations by Loughney, John
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 5
Major League Baseball and the Green Revolution:
A Market-Based Approach to Maintaining
Competitive Balance in the Face of Environmental
Regulations
John Loughney
Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
John Loughney, Major League Baseball and the Green Revolution: A Market-Based Approach to
Maintaining Competitive Balance in the Face of Environmental Regulations, 38 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. &
Pol'y Rev. 709 (2014), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol38/iss3/5
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND THE GREEN
REVOLUTION: A MARKET-BASED APPROACH
TO MAINTAINING COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN
THE FACE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
JOHN LOUGHNEY*
Both sides must understand that any blows at the thing
called baseball would be regarded by [T]his [C]ourt as a
blow to a national institution.1
These were the words of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, before
whose bench was brought a dispute in 1915 between the established “major”
baseball leagues—at that time the National and American Leagues, known
collectively as Organized Baseball—and the upstart Federal League, to
the parties of that suit.2 The Federal League, much like the American
League before it, was seeking to shed the shackles of its title as a “minor,”
or inferior, league, and brought suit under the Sherman Act, contesting
the contractual hiring practices of the “major” leagues.3
Judge Landis’s comments,4 which now occupy a hallowed spot in
the American pastime’s history, also have some symbolic value. They
represent a great willingness—not only among the general public but
among the legal system—to distinguish treatment of professional sports
organizations, and especially baseball, from that of other businesses.5
* J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School; B.A. in French from the University of
Maryland, 2011.
1 J. G. TAYLOR SPINK, JUDGE LANDIS AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BASEBALL 35 (1947).
2 Id.
3 See Peter Bendix, The History of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, BEYOND THE BOX
SCORE (Dec. 3, 2008, 5:00 AM), http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/12/3/678134/the
-history-of-baseball-s; see also SPINK, supra note 1, at 32–33. Among the disputed con-
tractual provisions were “10-day clauses,” which gave franchises the right to abrogate
contracts within 10 days of their signing, but denied this right to players.
4 Judge Landis also noted, when future Pennsylvania Senator George Wharton Pepper
referred to baseball players’ activities as “labor,” that “[a]s a result of thirty years of ob-
servation, [he was] shocked” to hear that term applied to playing baseball. SPINK, supra
note 1, at 35.
5 The best example of this is the antitrust exception that courts have repeatedly affirmed
over the years. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (addressing the
antitrust exception in the context of college football); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972);
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One judge went so far as to say that “baseball cannot be analogized to
any other business or even to any other sport or entertainment.”6 Indeed,
while the Federal League’s grievances would eventually be aired in court,7
it was against Judge Landis’s efforts; the Ohioan, named for the famous
Civil War battle,8 would reserve judgment for over a year, essentially
forcing the parties to settle.9 The message was clear even then, without
the benefit of hindsight: Landis had “proclaim[ed] from the bench that
[baseball] is a public institution that no one shall think of harming . . . .
[T]he game is safe in his hands.”10 The modern era of baseball’s antitrust
exception, then, began with the personal vendetta of a well-positioned
Cubs fan against whatever might hurt his team.11 Judge Landis went on
to become the first commissioner of baseball,12 further cementing his
historical notoriety.13
But the Green Revolution has arrived, and professional sports
represent a great coup for the cause. The prospect of this high-profile,
well-moneyed, and influential industry adopting eco-friendly policies is
of increasing interest to insiders and outsiders alike.14  Baseball’s in-
creasingly environmentally conscious presence—including more and
more LEED-certified venues, the use of alternative energy sources, and
carbon offset purchases—has earned it the public approbation of environ-
mental groups.15 Long-term plans for carbon emission reduction in the
United States, however, will not ignore the professional sports industry and
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (addressing the antitrust excep-
tion in the context of baseball).
6 Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Mitchell Nathanson, Truly
Sovereign at Last: C.B.C. Distribution v. MLB AM and the Redefinition of the Concept of
Baseball, 89 OR. L. REV. 581, 582 (2010).
7 Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
8 SPINK, supra note 1, at 1.
9 Id. at 37–38.
10 Id. at 36.
11 Id. at 36–38.
12 See id. at 74.
13 See id. at 20. Judge Landis also heard arguments in the famous antitrust dispute
between John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company and the United States, fining
Standard Oil $29,240,000—unprecedented in 1907. His judgment, however, was reversed,
and the case went on to become a seminal bit of antitrust law: Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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Major League Baseball16—unless, perhaps, Judge Keneshaw Mountain
Landis has judicial acolytes waiting in the wings.
Major League Baseball (“MLB”), however, is a business, and each
of its primary parts—the franchise owners, the League itself, and the
players—pledge allegiance to their bottom lines before the environment.17
Embracing the national trend toward eco-consciousness will mean recon-
ciling the accompanying financial burdens with the benefits of meaningful
policy change; this is especially true given MLB’s structural dependence
on a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that contemplates first and
foremost mechanical considerations like competitive balance, revenue
sharing, and labor negotiations.18 Judicial precedent recognizes, at least to
some extent, the value of protecting competitive balance in the context of
organized sports,19 and MLB’s interest in doing so seems self-preservative
and reasonable. Deserving closer consideration are the questions of how
environmentally conscious policies might disturb competitive balance,
how those costs might be defrayed with benefits to the owners, players,
and the League itself, and why MLB is an appropriate venue to test
green policies.
The following proposes a cap-and-trade carbon emissions and off-
sets market internal to Major League Baseball, which would allow teams
to aggregate the burden of conformity to an eco-friendly directive within
the existing CBA structure and facilitate the transition into a greener or-
ganization without sacrificing the League’s competitive integrity.
I. BASEBALL, PROGRESSIVISM, AND COMPETITIVE BALANCE
Baseball, whose first major professional league was born in 1876,20
has observed, and even encouraged, the growth of American society during
16 See, e.g., Alex B. Porteshawver, Symposium Comment, Green Sports Facilities: Why
Adopting New Green-Building Policies Will Improve the Environment and the Community,
20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 241 (2009) (discussing existing local, state, and federal green-
building laws and advocating stricter environmental standards for stadiums); W. S. Miller,
Changing Playing Fields: The Sports Attorney’s Obligation to Learn Green, 21 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 139 (2010) (advising that sports lawyers will inevitably need to draw upon
environmental law in practice).
17 Porteshawver, supra note 16, at 1–2.
18 See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba
_english.pdf.
19 See, e.g., NCAA v. Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117–20 (1983).
20 Peter Bendix, The History of the American and National League, Part I, BEYOND THE
BOX SCORE (Nov. 18, 2008, 5:00 AM), http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2008/11/18
/664028/the-history-of-the-america.
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three different centuries. During this time, it has earned a reputation for
progressivism.21 In the environmental cadre, MLB commissioner Allan
(“Bud”) Selig is among the most influential and active environmental
advocates in sports history, having overseen an era of expansion for en-
vironmentally minded policies in organized athletics.22 Individual base-
ball franchises also participate in green initiatives, with some dabbling
in carbon offset markets and paying increased attention to the environ-
mental burdens associated with large events.23
Professional baseball’s stance on social issues—where it is possi-
ble for a sports league to take one—has generally proven more progressive
than that of the general public; perhaps the most vivid example was cele-
brated in 1947, when Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier with his
debut for the Brooklyn Dodgers.24 The Supreme Court of the United States
would not declare that “separate . . . [is] inherently unequal” until 1954,25
and the effectiveness of judicial mandate in achieving real desegregation
in schools has been called into question.26 Meanwhile, MLB stands as a
21 See, e.g., Peter Panancy, Major League Baseball Finds Its Roots in Progressive America,
BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 11, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/661802-major
-league-baseball-finds-its-roots-in-progressive-america (discussing baseball’s roots in the
Progressive Era of American history and its cultural significance during that period). But
see Steven A. Riess, Professional Baseball and American Culture in the Progressive Era,
NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR SPORT HISTORY PROCEEDINGS 40–41 (1975) (acknowledging
baseball’s reputation for progressivism but offering only tempered support for its impact
on social mobility).
22 Lyle Spencer, Selig Honored for Environmental Sustainability Efforts, MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL (Sept. 7, 2012, 2:40 AM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20120906
&content_id=37993594&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb (“Bud Selig . . . accepted the Green
Sports Alliance’s first Environmental Leadership Award. . . . ‘It is no exaggeration to say
that [Selig] is the single most influential advocate in the history of sports’”).
23 See, e.g., Press Release, Seattle Mariners, Mariners Stage Carbon-Neutral Game for
Earth Day (Apr. 20, 2012)  [hereinafter Mariners Press Release], available at http://seattle
.mariners.mlb.com/news/print.jsp?ymd=20120420&content_id=29297414&vkey=pr_sea
&c_id=sea; Hershkowitz, supra note 14.
24 CHRIS LAMB, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: SPORTSWRITERS AND THE LONG CAMPAIGN TO
DESEGREGATE BASEBALL 16 (2012) (“When the Brooklyn Dodgers announced on October 23,
1945, that [Jackie Robinson had signed with the organization], black newspapers and their
readers responded with rapture. . . . To black America the signing of Robinson tran-
scended the white lines of baseball to the white lines of American society.”).
25 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26 See, e.g., Jonathan Kozol, Overcoming Apartheid, THE NATION, Dec. 19, 2005, available
at http://www.thenation.com/article/overcoming-apartheid (citing Harvard University’s
Civil Rights Project, which found school segregation to be in decline).
2014] MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND THE GREEN REVOLUTION 713
shining example of racial integration and merit-based hiring.27 While de-
mographics change annually,28 racial integration in the MLB community
is remarkably consistent, and baseball has demonstrated a commitment to
embracing international players as well.29 Further, there is evidence that
even long before Branch Rickey signed Jackie Robinson in 1946, the move-
ment from within baseball to break down walls built on race was raging.30
Embracing new levels of racial equality during the 1930s (even if they re-
main horrifyingly inadequate by modern standards) proved baseball’s role
not only as a gauge, but as a driver of American cultural sentiment.
Environmentally progressive policy preferences are reflected in
recent trends around the League. Ball parks, especially those of recent
construction, are increasingly LEED31 certified.32 Solar panels are in-
creasingly ubiquitous, and some franchises have developed initiatives for
environmental awareness.33 The Seattle Mariners, for example, celebrate
Earth Day in part by purchasing carbon offsets to negate the emissions
associated with that day’s game.34 The Mariners compensate for emis-
sions associated with Safeco Field’s natural gas, water, and electricity
usage, as well as the visiting team and umpires’ air travel and hotel-
related emissions.35 They also offset the fans’ travel emissions and sup-
port large recycling and waste disposal programs.36 The recycled waste
is redistributed to fans as “Safeco Field Soil.”37 Recycling and composting
are on the rise around the league.38 Especially in this era of increased
27 See RICHARD LAPCHICK ET AL., THE 2011 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE INSTITUTE FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHICS IN SPORT, Apr. 21, 2011,
available at http://www.tidesport.org/RGRC/2011/2011_MLB_RGRC_FINAL.pdf (grading
MLB a B+ overall for its minority penetration, including an A+ for players).
28 Id. at 3, 20–34.
29 Id. at 3.
30 LAMB, supra note 24, at 4–5 (presenting evidence that high-profile baseball players,
managers, and writers favored racial integration as early as the 1930s).
31 See Porteshawver, supra note 16 (noting that LEED directives are the leading method
for green building); see also LEED Is Driving the Green Building Industry, U.S. GREEN
BLDG. COUNCIL, http://new.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (explaining LEED
certification).
32 See Hershkowitz, supra note 14.
33 Id.




38 See Hershkowitz, supra note 14.
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eco-awareness, MLB and individual franchises alike seem to recognize a
moral imperative39 and market boon40 in publicized sustainability efforts.
These avenues for success are dual motivators. Major League
Baseball, and private industry in general, will naturally embrace new
eco-friendly policies more readily if they come wrapped up in increased
profitability. Recent market trends suggest that these two goals are far
from mutually exclusive.41
As environmentally oriented publicity campaigns and products
continue to see success,42 the case for eco-friendly policies as sound busi-
ness practice—despite the associated costs—is increasingly convincing.43
What is more, some have proposed that climate change has had deleteri-
ous effects on the national pastime’s actual gameplay,44 suggesting that
new environmentally friendly policies might be a step toward protecting
the value of MLB’s product.
Now that the public increasingly manifests a demand for sustain-
able options45 for their food, transportation, and lodgings, among other
things, it follows that the sports and entertainment industries should be
subject to—and thus positioned to benefit from—those demands.46 MLB
39 See, e.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: CITIZENS AND SCIENTISTS FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL SOLUTIONS, General Electric Company (GE), available at http://www.ucsusa.org
/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/corporate-profiles/general-electric.pdf (citing General
Electric’s support of efforts to decrease and eventually reverse greenhouse gas growth—
this from another large commercial entity).
40 LEED Is Driving the Green Building Industry, supra note 31 (detailing commercial
advantages to LEED certification).
41 Id.; see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 577 (2009) (“Asking why firms produce al-
truism is like asking why Toyota produces the Camry or Apple produces the iPod Nano. . . .
[T]hey do so because there is consumer demand for it and the company is able to produce
it at competitive cost.”).
42 See Hershkowitz, supra note 14.
43 Henderson & Malani, supra note 41, at 582 (suggesting a shareholder and market
demand for social good as a corporate product).
44 Richard P. Larrick et al., Temper, Temperature, and Temptation: Heat-Related Retaliation
in Baseball, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 4 (2011); Elliott Negin, Major League Baseball Copes with
Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2012, 9:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/elliott-negin/major-league-baseball-cop_b_1785103.html. But see XM MLB Chat,
MLB Players Are Beaned or Leave After 3 Innings on Hot Days Because Fans Drive to the
Stadium, Use Light Bulbs? No. UCS Denies Science & US CO2 Drop (Aug. 18, 2012),
http://xmmlbchat.blogspot.com/2012/08/mlb-players-are-beaned-or-leave-after-3.html.
45 Miller, supra note 16, at 142; see also NEIL Z. STERN & WILLARD N. ANDER, GREEN-
TAILING AND OTHER REVOLUTIONS IN RETAILING 58 (2008) (outlining financial incentives
of “going green”).
46 Miller, supra note 16, at 141–42.
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has the opportunity to convert a potential public relations liability into
a positive campaign.
Positive motivators aside, MLB also faces potentially undesirable
consequences from future government regulation. The CBA that governs
MLB is a carefully negotiated agreement broaching virtually every issue
associated with the game.47 One of the CBA’s primary motives is to cre-
ate competitive balance among the thirty MLB franchises, guaranteeing
that every game is a valuable product of the League’s organization.48
The current CBA is designed to shift money from large markets
to small markets using a multilayered process that gathers and redistrib-
utes funds using both flat and variable rates.49 All clubs pay thirty-four
percent of their Net Local Revenue (essentially clubs’ gross revenue, minus
their annual MLB allowance and some expenses)50 to a central fund, which
is then divided equally among the franchises.51 The revenue sharing pro-
gram also establishes another central fund, into which only certain clubs
pay (based on rates that vary for each club and between years), and from
which certain clubs draw (again, at variable rates).52 Naturally, the regime
includes plenty of additional stipulations and rules, but it suffices for
current intents and purposes to agree that this delicately balanced, if im-
perfect, system does not contemplate externally imposed environmental
controls.53 Any regulation imposing liability on individual franchises would
have a naturally disparate effect,54 and franchise revenue disparity under
47 See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18; Maury Brown, Inside MLB’s
New 5-Year Labor Agreement, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Nov. 22, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www
.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5521:inside-mlbs
-new-5-year-labor-agreement&catid=30:mlb-news&Itemid=42.
48 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18, at 110–52 (detailing, under Articles XXIII
and XXIV, the Competitive Balance Tax and the Revenue Sharing Plan, both of which
are designed to compensate for the increased revenue enjoyed by franchises based in
large markets); see also Wendy Thurm, The Marlins and the MLB Revenue Sharing System,
FANGRAPHS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/marlins-mlb-revenue
-sharing-syste/ (explaining the revenue sharing program in a straightforward and accu-
rate manner).
49 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18, at 110–52.
50 Id. at 119–20.
51 Thurm, supra note 48; see also 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18, at 121.
52 Thurm, supra note 48; see also 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18, at 121–23.
53 See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18 (containing no references to
externally imposed environmental controls).
54 Because each franchise is a unique brand and occupies a unique market, each fran-
chise’s impact on the environment is unique. The Yankees—quintessentially successful
in the realms of attendance and merchandising and located in New York City—have a
larger carbon footprint than the Tampa Bay Rays, a comparatively small-market team.
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the new CBA is already the subject of debate.55 It has been suggested
that the current revenue sharing system is susceptible to abuse, and per-
haps has already been mined.56 In fact, the tension between larger-
market, high-revenue franchises and small-market franchises has been
the subject of legal, political, and fiscal debate in the baseball community
for some time.57
The Los Angeles Dodgers’ recent television contract with Time
Warner Cable (valued at over $7 billion over two decades)58 has also high-
lighted trouble with the current revenue sharing paradigm.59 Thanks to
a favorable bankruptcy court ruling,60 the Dodgers television deal has
been assigned a value at $84 million (note that the deal’s actual value of
$7 billion greatly exceeds this), leaving the Dodgers with an unrivaled
revenue stream that sharing rules currently in place can only dent.61
55 Maury Brown, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of MLB’s New Labor Agreement, THE
BIZ OF BASEBALL (Nov. 23, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option
=com_content&view=article&id=5522:good-bad&catid=26:editorials&Itemid=39; Adam
Dorhauer, More Complex Than a Salary Cap: Financial Disparity in MLB, THE HARDBALL
TIMES BASEBALL ANNUAL (2013), at 229; see also Jon Berkon, Note and Comment, A Giant
Whiff: Why the New CBA Fails Baseball’s Smartest Small Market Franchises, 4 DEPAUL
J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (2007) (outlining similar failings in the previous CBA).
56 Maury Brown, How the Miami Marlins Lost Their Minds, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Nov. 13,
2012, 11:12 PM), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=5755:how-the-miami-marlins-lost-their-minds&catid=26:editorials&Itemid=39.
57 See generally Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market Teams in
Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.REV. 323 (1994) (discussing the need for small-
market teams and how best to keep them); Bryan Day, Labor Pains: Why Contraction Is
Not the Solution to Major League Baseball’s Competitive Balance Problems, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 521 (2002) (arguing that competitive imbalance is
undermining baseball).
58 Maury Brown, Dodgers, TWC Announce Landmark TV Deal Creating SportsNet LA,
THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=5801:dodgers-twc-announce-landmark-tv-deal
-in-sportsnet-la&catid=57:television&Itemid=122; Wendy Thurm, Dodgers to Launch
SportsNetLA in $7-Plus Billion Deal, FANGRAPHS (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.fangraphs
.com/blogs/index.php/dodgers-to-launch-sportsnetla-in-7-plus-billion-tv-deal/; Rob Neyer,
The Meaning of the Dodgers’ New TV Deal, BASEBALL NATION (Jan. 25, 2013, 5:26 PM),
http://mlb.sbnation.com/2013/1/25/3915480/la-dodgers-new-tv-deal-contract-network.
59 Wendy Thurm, Revenue-Sharing Flexibility Stretches with New TV Deals, FANGRAPHS
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/revenue-sharing-flexibility
-stretches-with-new-tv-deals/.
60 Dayn Perry, Don’t Forget: Dodgers TV Windfall Bigger Than You Think, EYE ON
BASEBALL (Nov. 26, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/blog/eye-on-baseball
/21137250/don’t-forget-dodgers-tv-windfall-bigger-than-you-think.
61 Thurm, supra note 58 (acknowledging this problem, but also noting that the Supple-
mental Plan might somewhat mitigate the negative effects).
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This is all to say that the current CBA, in force through 2016,62 may well
prove inadequate to handle the implications of new television deals and
the unprecedented amounts of money they might bring to MLB.63 In 2012,
approximately $400 million in revenue was shared.64 Revenue projections
for the 2013 season65 suggest that the Dodgers individually would share
almost close to that amount alone if not for the bankruptcy court ruling.66
Any new environmental regulations would of course have to be negotiated
into the next CBA, and if the market for television contracts continues
as the 2012–2013 offseason has forecasted it might, serious changes in the
revenue sharing structure might accompany that renegotiation. Despite
this element of uncertainty, an influx of Net Local Revenue would give
franchises more flexibility to share revenue, perhaps increasing their
capacity to accommodate new (and expensive) green policies.
Bound up in franchises’ brands and markets are their relation-
ships with local governments.67 The construction of large venues like base-
ball stadiums carries tremendous resource costs, and the product expends
terrific amounts of energy, generates mountains of waste, and exacer-
bates pre-existing transportation problems.68 It should come as no sur-
prise, then, that sports facilities are often constructed under cooperative
deals between franchises and governments.69 Both stand to reap benefits
from a well-planned, well-connected, and environmentally friendly venue.70
Local governments, though, will inevitably legislate building codes differ-
ently and on different timelines;71 this suggests that normalizing regulation
62 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18, at 1.
63 Thurm, supra note 58.
64 Maury Brown, MLB Revenue-Sharing for 2012 Approx. $400 Million, THE BIZ OF
BASEBALL (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:58 AM), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=5772:mlb-revenue-sharing-for-2012-approx-400-million&catid
=30:mlb-news&Itemid=42.
65 Neyer, supra note 58.
66 Thirty-four percent of the projected TV revenue of $350 million, plus additional Net
Local Revenue, would be shared. Then, an additional percentage (determined by the
Dodgers franchise’s Performance Factor) would be shared. Only time will provide precise
figures, but the total sharing amount might even have exceeded $400 million.
67 See generally Porteshawver, supra note 16 (discussing federal, state, and local govern-
ments’ roles in the construction of sports venues and in green building in general).
68 See generally id. at 248–49 (noting, inter alia, that 79 million attendees consume live
baseball each year, and that Safeco Field alone generates 2.8 million pounds of trash each
year in the relatively small market of Seattle).
69 Id. at 249–51.
70 Id. at 249–51.
71 Id. at 244–47 (describing the steps various cities have taken to go green, including, for
example, requiring LEED certification for all newly constructed buildings).
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is best done through the common denominator in all of these deals, which
is the Major League franchise.
While the relationship between franchises and local government
does indeed make a lot of sense,72 very recent events have called the fu-
ture of these deals into question.73 The Miami Marlins recently agreed
with the City of Miami and Miami-Dade County to build a new stadium,
only to unload many of the team’s assets—specifically, player contracts—
that were expected to generate revenue.74 Wendy Thurm eloquently sum-
marized how this scandal reminded public investors of the dangers of
cooperation with private profit-minded actors: “Even if the economics [of
a publicly subsidized stadium] make sense . . . it’s still an extraordinary
expenditure of public funds for the benefit of a privately held sports team.”75
To make matters worse for Miami-area taxpayers, their government fi-
nanced its subsidy of about $500 million in part with a $91 million loan
that will amount to an obligation of $1.2 billion, not to be paid in full until
2048.76 Speculation about the future of franchise-government cooperation
abounds, but projected chill should reinforce the preference of League-
side environmental regulation.
To summarize: the bad news for advocates of green policies is that
environmental controls are another complication to an already-complex
revenue sharing program that will keep changing. The good news is that
a system for offsetting disparately imposed costs already exists in MLB,
and there is reason to believe that another beneficiary of revenue sharing—
namely, the environment—could be added to the mix. Major League Base-
ball itself, and not the government, is best positioned to institute broad
reforms that take advantage of the revenue sharing system already in
place to improve sustainability.
72 Id. at 243–65 (discussing the benefits of collaboration between franchises and local
governments to construct venues, albeit citing risks).
73 See Wendy Thurm, Did the Marlins Kill Publicly-Financed Ballparks?, FANGRAPHS
(Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/did-the-marlins-kill-publicly
-financed-ballparks/ (exploring franchises’ relationships with their local governments);
Douglas Hanks, How a $91 Million Loan on the Marlins Ballpark Will Cost Miami-Dade
$1.2 Billion, THE MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/01/24
/3199018/how-a-91million-loan-on-the-marlins.html#storylink=cpy (discussing the pitfalls
of franchises’ financial arrangements with local government).
74 Thurm, supra note 73.
75 Id.
76 Hanks, supra note 73.
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II. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND CAP-AND-TRADE
Perhaps the simplest conception of environmental regulation is
a command structure. Under such a regime, the regulator (usually the
government) stipulates what rules the governed must follow77: perhaps
guidelines for the application of carbon scrubbers to smokestacks or limits
on carbon emissions. Command regulations have been criticized for their
rigidity, but praised for their effectiveness at setting certain minimum
standards.78 Another approach, structurally more complex but cheaper
to implement, is the market-based regulatory system.79 Market-based
regulatory schemes rely on the free trade of a limited number of carbon
emission allowances and/or carbon offsets.80 That is, rather than stipulat-
ing that a regulated entity must take certain steps to reduce its emissions,
the regulator allocates allowances for market participants to trade among
themselves according to their need.81 Emissions credits and offsets82 are
useful units to trade because they are homogenous, quantifiable, and do
not vary widely in quality (when correctly moderated)83—valuable quali-
ties in a trade chip.84 The market mechanism, used as a means of enforcing
a more comprehensive regulatory program that includes certain command
elements—specifically, a cap on allowable emissions—results in the cap-
and-trade market, regarded as a tremendously effective means of enforc-
ing environmental regulations.85
Cap-and-trade markets are popular because they have proven the
most cost-effective approach to meeting emissions goals, creating hard
77 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 22 (2001).
78 Id.
79 See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 298 (2008).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Precisely what sort of emissions or offsets are being traded, while by no means
immaterial, is important during the planning phase only insomuch as those chips are
available for trade. Candidates include sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic
compounds, and carbon dioxide. RICHARD F. KOSOBUD ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY’S NEW APPROACH 4 (2000).
83 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, The Bottom Line on Offsets, 17 THE BOTTOM LINE ON . . .
1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://pdf.wri.org/bottom_line_offsets.pdf.
84 Byron Swift, U.S. Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and Opportunities, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT. 3 (2005).
85 Id.
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limits on actual emissions.86 Already in effect in Europe, cap-and-trade
is increasingly favored among American academics and politicians.87 In
fact, such markets have been proposed for large-scale implementation.88
Major League Baseball’s configuration as a small consortium of well-
capitalized actors makes it an interesting cap-and-trade subject. Some
essential elements of maintaining an effective regulatory program, such
as accurate monitoring,89 would be very easily accomplished. While ex-
penses associated with monitoring are often an obstacle to less sophisti-
cated actors,90 MLB franchises are both wealthy and limited, creating an
ideal administrative environment. On the other hand, there is evidence
to suggest that the size of the MLB market is small enough that efficien-
cies associated with market operations might not be meted out.91 A suf-
ficient number of trade sources is important.92 Another consideration is
the availability of the trade unit—for instance, carbon dioxide credits.93
There exist more than a few international organizations dedicated to
marketing these trade chips, including South Pole Carbon,94 Sustainable
Carbon,95 Climate Friendly,96 Native Energy,97 and Emergent Ventures
International.98 Finally, Swift notes the importance of enforceability.99
86 Stavins, supra note 79, at 298; Swift, supra note 84, at 3.
87 Nathaniel Keohane, Symposium Article, The New Regulatory Climate: Greenhouse Gas
Regulation in the Obama Administration: The Urgency of U.S. Action on Climate Change,
and the Prospects for Legislation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7 (2010).
88 See generally Stavins, supra note 79; Keohane, supra note 87, at 7–8.
89 Swift, supra note 84, at 1.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Dorhauer, supra note 55, at 240 (comparing the value of dollars spent on free
agents, acquired on the free market for talent, to the value of dollars spent on arbitrated
contracts, which are set by a neutral panel. Arbitrated deals create far more value per
dollar than free agent contracts, suggesting competitive interests drive prices up on the
open market).
92 Swift, supra note 84, at 1.
93 Id.
94 See generally SOUTH POLE CARBON, http://www.southpolecarbon.com/ (last visited
Mar. 16, 2014).
95 See generally SUSTAINABLE CARBON, http://www.sustainablecarbon.com/ (last visited
Mar. 16, 2014).
96 See generally CLIMATE FRIENDLY, http://www.climatefriendly.com/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2014).
97 See generally NATIVE ENERGY, http://www.nativeenergy.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
98 See generally EMERGENT VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, http://www.emergent-ventures
.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
99 Swift, supra note 84, at 1.
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The nature of MLB’s governance makes this final consideration a non-
issue. Because any cap-and-trade market would necessarily be the prod-
uct of negotiations between all involved parties, the regulated entities
would be contractually obligated to perform. Provided sufficient moni-
toring measures, the League’s executive discretion, and if necessary the
United States court system, would be well-positioned to enforce any reg-
ulatory scheme.
Despite possible weaknesses, exploration of a small-scale cap-and-
trade market for MLB seems like a useful exercise. Similar approaches
have been implemented in the United States with some success,100 al-
though never with a population quite like MLB. Typically, cap-and-trade
markets feature larger populations and pursue a very broad impact.101
It makes sense that a heavily self-regulated organization like
MLB should implement cap-and-trade, if it is assumed that reducing
emissions is a valid goal. Major League Baseball combines a very diverse
membership—thirty franchises,102 located across the United States, each
with varied resource pools, access to infrastructure, venues, pollution
productions, and relationships with local government—with a powerful
control structure that prioritizes financial success and the League’s in-
tegrity. This broad geographical base and diverse population makes MLB
an apt testing ground for the broad market approach.103 In this way,
MLB is positioned to “open the door” to private cap-and-trade markets,
just as it did to racial desegregation in the 1940s.104
100 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 19–22 (detailing four cap-and-trade markets, in-
cluding one nation-wide market, one market covering multiple states, and two covering
only metropolitan areas, with each targeting different industries).
101 See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 79, at 300 (discussing the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, which represent the most significant implementation of domestic cap-and-trade.
It is estimated this program generates over $1 billion in savings annually, and cut emis-
sions from the power sector by over 5 million tons between 1990 and 2005).
102 Standing, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/standings/exhibition.jsp?tcid=mm_mlb_standings
#20130929 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
103 But see Jonathan R. Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing
Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.
569 (2001) (emphasizing market schemes’ value in the context of local regulation); Todd
Jefferson Hartley, Handshake Deals: The Future of Informal State Agreements and the
Interstate Compacts Clause, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2011) (emphasizing inter-
state dealings).
104 See LAMB, supra note 24.
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III. BUILDING A MARKET
An analysis of emissions trading and its fit for a private associa-
tion like MLB should begin with a review of the cap-and-trade market’s
components and the potential approaches MLB might consider for its
implementation of such a market. Emissions trading is largely misunder-
stood and, like an iceberg, the vastness of its potential has yet to see the
light of day.105
Carbon offsets,106 also known as greenhouse gas offsets, are units
of carbon dioxide equivalents.107 They are measured in tons, and repre-
sent carbon dioxide emissions that have been negated in some fashion,
either by avoiding or reducing the emission or by compensating for it
elsewhere.108 There is no standard offset; these are not products to be
bought.109 Rather, they are units that measure the effectiveness of behav-
ior with a net impact of reducing carbon emissions.110
To be considered effective, several criteria must be met.111 Perma-
nence is an important consideration.112 This concern usually comes into
play in scenarios where offsets sequester carbon emissions that could re-
enter the atmosphere at a later time.113 Investing in forestation, for ex-
ample, might be an ineffective attempt at offsetting emissions, because
forest fires or decay could reverse the emissions reduction.114
Offsets must also be additional to whatever emissions-generating
project they are intended to balance.115 Behavior that is not responsive
to cap-and-trade market incentives, but rather constitutes typical opera-
tion, cannot constitute an offset.116 Market players must first establish,
in addition to the above-mentioned baseline emissions measurements, a
105 Swift, supra note 84.
106 It is convenient to refer to the offsets and credits discussed herein as carbon, as this is
a popularly traded offset. See Carbon Offsetting Explained, THE CARBONNEUTRAL CO.,
http://www.carbonneutral.com/knowledge-centre/carbon-offsetting-explained (last visited
Mar. 16, 2014). However, trade chips could take the form of other pollutant units. Swift,
supra note 84, at 3.






113 But see KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 26 (noting that the bankability of a traded
right can have value under certain circumstances).
114 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 83, at 1.
115 Id. at 1–2.
116 Id. at 1.
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baseline operations model (for instance, a cost-benefit analysis for a given
project) that does not contemplate an emissions purchase.117 The carbon
offsets are necessarily external to this equation.118
Additionally, the practical qualifications of enforceability and veri-
fiability, though not academically significant, are essential to an effective
market.119 An offset is verifiable if its purchase can be confirmed; it is en-
forceable if it can be traced back to its purchaser and distinguished from
others’ offsets, the goal being to avoid double-counting.120
Carbon credits are even less tangible, because they are fictional
constructs of the regulating body.121 The regulator sets a cap-and-trade
reduction on allowable pollutants calculated based on some baseline.122
Any regulated entity exceeding this level is sanctioned in some way.123 Of
course, picking a baseline and determining an appropriate reduction from
that level (including how long is necessary to reach that reduction) is reg-
ularly a subject of debate between regulators and regulatees.124
Major League Baseball would be no different. An effective baseline
uses reliable measurements to set a realistic starting point for gradual
emissions reductions.125 Unfortunately, comprehensive information on
baseball-related emissions is not available. An effective baseline would
take that data into account, and then set reductions at amounts and in-
tervals that reflect the franchises’ collective ability to reduce aggregate
emissions.126 Included among those considerations would be each fran-
chise’s local environmental regulations, the potential for a new or im-
proved venue, and opportunities to reduce emissions through programs
undertaken independently.
Major League Baseball would also need to determine whether to
adopt a cap-and-allowance program or a credit trading program.127 The for-
mer imposes a permanent emissions cap inside of which market partici-
pants may trade allowances; the latter is a market element that attaches
117 Id. at 1–2.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 2.
120 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 83, at 2.
121 Stavins, supra note 79, at 297.
122 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 27.
123 Stavins, supra note 79, at 298.
124 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 27.
125 Id. at 23, 27.
126 Id. at 27 (advocating the principle of measured reduction intervals outside the specific
context of MLB).
127 Swift, supra note 84, at 2–3.
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to an existing regulatory structure, allowing actors to trade any emis-
sions credits left over after clearing cap space.128 A cap-and-allowance
program seems like the obvious choice—especially given that MLB is not
currently subject to any regulatory regime—but the alternative has its
merits. For example, if after some testing, MLB decided the most effec-
tive approach to emissions reduction was to impose caps on individual
franchises rather than to set an aggregate cap, a credit trading program
might be the best option.
An effective emissions trading market can be defined through a
series of dichotomies.129 Both for the sake of simplicity and because it
faithfully reflects the sort of approach that the founders of an emissions
market would take to structuring the community,130 these dichotomies
will serve as the basis for this hypothetical MLB market. If an effective
market is like a tree,131 it is best to start at the roots and grow the model
upwards to get the whole picture. This is the most intellectually honest
approach, because it is true to reality and precludes the supposition of any
circumstances other than the essential hypothetical that constitutes this
experiment: that MLB wishes to institute an emissions trading market.
The first dichotomy is between public and private market negotia-
tion.132 That is, will the government or private actors devise the resolution
to the negative externality of pollution?133 Under most circumstances, the
public option alone is viable. A regulatory scheme designed to protect the
general public welfare encompasses countless parties (individuals, corpo-
rations, etc.), and to bring each affected party together to negotiate effec-
tively would be impossible.134 Those same individuals, independently,
probably lack the wherewithal to make a difference.135 For a more con-
ventional analysis, it would be clear that government regulation is neces-
sary. However, MLB is self-governed and enjoys a strong central executive
authority.136 Further, the public at large is not the primary player in this
case.137 Thirty franchises can negotiate among themselves much more
128 Id. at 4, 8–9.
129 See generally KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 3–40.
130 Id. at 3–5.
131 Id. at 5. 
132  Id. at 6.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 6.
136 See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18.
137 But see KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 25 (suggesting that secondary, non-covered
players might contribute to the market. Independent brokers, for example, might increase
market efficiency).
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easily than can an innumerable public. A private resolution thus seems
like a feasible option.
In fact, a hybrid of the two seems ideal. By utilizing the pseudo-
governmental authority of Major League Baseball (the executive entity),
a MLB market could access the benefits of a strong facilitator without
sacrificing its private sovereignty.138
The degree of MLB intervention into franchise operations is the
next consideration.139 A market-based resolution typically requires the
government to assign emissions rights (or allowances), the distribution
of which is based on cost-benefit analyses that weigh the burden placed
on players in the market against the public benefit of such limitations.140
For MLB, this cost-benefit analysis seeks a balance between the
financial benefits and product protection that a degree of environmental
consciousness offers. At the collective bargaining table, the Players’ Union
will ensure that player salaries do not adversely bear the cost of regula-
tion; the same goes for the owners and their franchises, and the League
itself for its own interests.141
In theory, markets seek out efficiency.142 That is, given an efficient
market where transaction costs do not prohibit trade, players in a market
will redistribute amongst themselves whatever emissions allowances the
government issues, regardless of the appropriateness of the original dis-
tribution. This is precisely the value of a market.143 In the MLB context,
regulatory efforts would benefit from this effect, although its smaller mar-
ket would undoubtedly carry higher transactional costs.144 Internalizing
these costs without undue negative effect will be one of the challenges of
an emissions market. Of course, nothing would stop MLB from admitting
outside brokers into the private market.145 Even if those brokers were
restricted from marketing (or buying) allowances, offsets trading could
drive the price of allowances to the margin and negate market inefficien-
cies inherent in the MLB structure.
138 There is good evidence to suggest MLB is highly motivated to do just this. See
Nathanson, supra note 6, at 582–83.
139 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 6–8.
140 Id.
141 See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18.
142 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4.16 ECONOMICA 387 (1937).
143 Id. (quoting Sir Arthur Salter: “The normal economic system works itself. For its cur-
rent operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole
range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand and production
to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive.”).
144 Id. at 390–91.
145 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 25.
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The next dichotomy refers to whether the basic market approach
uses centralized or decentralized control.146 Under a centralized model,
the government is responsible for establishing exact performance stan-
dards and regulating specific technologies.147 This approach has seen
widespread institution, and the results are evident in our daily lives;
carbon scrubbers on smokestacks and catalytic converters on cars, for
example, are the products of centralized emissions control legislation.148
The centralized model offers the benefit of guaranteeing (if compliance
is assumed, at least) that certain measures are taken to reduce emis-
sions, and also leaves the government with a fairly clear idea of the costs
associated with making those reductions.149 It is a highly effective way
of enforcing minimal standards.
Despite this, the centralized approach becomes increasingly inef-
fective as the scope of market regulation expands.150 Imposing baseline
regulations and demanding certain technologies be employed to cut emis-
sions is a small task compared to comprehensive market management.151
As regulatory efforts become more ambitious, the costs associated with
them increase.152 The government is often ill-suited to regulate compre-
hensively, and usually would prefer not to bear those costs, anyway. In
addition to this problem, such a system inevitably puts the regulator and
the regulated into a confrontational position.
The decentralized approach relies on an incentive-based market
that uses, for example, pollutant taxes to encourage market players to
reduce their carbon output, and provides them with an anonymous emis-
sions offsets market in which they can operate with autonomy.153 Under
this model, market players would presumably seek an efficient balance
between the penalties of non-compliance, the costs of compliance, and the
overall viability of their business model. In the specific context of MLB,
the market’s anonymity is very important. Players in this marketplace
are inherently opposed to each other’s success, so disempowering them
to use the emissions market as a method of compromising other teams
(or at least forcing them to incur some costs) is essential.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 9.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 9–11.
150 Id. at 10.
151 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 10–11.
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In reality, the ideal solution probably lies somewhere in between
these two approaches. The ease and simplicity of a centralized approach
makes it well-suited for enforcing certain standards across the board,
while the flexibility and efficiency of the decentralized approach makes
it the better backbone for any large-scale market plan. This is a fairly un-
controversial position, despite legislative history suggesting otherwise.154
The next dichotomy is between two possible approaches to decen-
tralized market control: taxes and trading.155 In theory, assuming a world
full of certainty, good information, and no transaction costs, this is a su-
perficial distinction to make.156 Under a tax regime, the regulated would
seek to minimize the taxes they incur and the control expenditures on re-
maining emissions. Under a market regime, the equation is very similar:
players minimize the costs incurred buying allowances on the market and
the control expenditures on remaining emissions. If emissions on the mar-
ket are purchasable at the same rate at which they are taxed, the two
systems differ only procedurally, and yield the same ultimate result.157
Reality has shown this theory to be incorrect, however; this is
mostly because the assumptions upon which it is predicated are not re-
liably present in the real world.158 This breeds error, which can have a
different impact on either system.
The potential for error depends on the regulator’s information on
how control costs and harms vary with emissions.159 If uncertain costs
vary little, but public harm varies significantly, a tax-based approach can
lead to serious error, because it allows less control than the issuance of
a given number of allowances.160 A regulator in a tax system is forced to
adjust rates to a happy equilibrium with marginal control costs, which
emitters will equate in their cost-benefit analyses but which might be un-
balanced.161 This constant changing of rates has potential to unsettle the
market, and would almost certainly be unpopular among the emitters.162
By contrast, in a system under which allowances are distributed com-
mensurate to the system’s net emissions, only the distribution of those
154 Id. at 11–12.
155 Id. at 12–13.
156 Id.
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allowances is of concern.163 This distinction is trivial when distribution
is arbitrary—for under this model distribution would be as capricious
and subject to change as a tax rate—but this is easily solved.164 The
regulator can auction the initial allowances into the market, allowing
players to purchase a package scaled to their demand (a demand which
they measure based on their own cost-benefit analyses, which they are
better placed to perform than the regulator). This naturally would dimin-
ish the regulator’s revenue, and whether the system’s increased efficiency
and legitimacy justifies this sacrifice is a legitimate question.165
The ensemble of expenses associated with a tax regime, as well as
tax rates’ somewhat fickle nature, have nevertheless driven the commu-
nity at large toward the emissions trading system.166
In the specific context of MLB, however, many of the disadvan-
tages associated with a tax policy are mitigated or eliminated. Logistical
costs on the regulator’s side could be significantly reduced to the size of the
regulated community, and rates might be easier to moderate. Further,
the political pitfalls associated with public sector regulation would be re-
duced, or even absent. MLB administration is not subject to the same
democratic accountability as, for example, a legislature passing regula-
tory laws or an executive enforcing them. Beyond this, any sort of regula-
tion would necessarily be instituted through the CBA—a document which
is bargained out between the emitters and regulator in direct terms. The
logical step between electing a representative and supporting that repre-
sentative’s legislation is not present here, which would help legitimacy.
The MLB market size also has potential negative implications on
an emissions market system. The emissions trade approach to regulation
is favored based on the presupposition of an efficient market. Markets
derive their efficiency from size, which makes generally available any de-
manded product at a competitive price. MLB offers perhaps too small a
market for real efficiency. What is more, the market players are within
the same industry that operates largely as a zero-sum game, with each
franchise competing for competitive success and revenue. Even in a con-
text where the players are totally cooperative, thirty players might not
generate the ideal market in which supply for a given demand is ubiqui-
tous. The increase in transaction costs associated with this inefficiency
might outweigh the supposed benefits of the market system.
163 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 14–15.
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This question obliges the analyst to consider what type of emis-
sions market best supports a given situation. The dichotomy here is be-
tween cap-and-trade (closed-system) trading and rate-based (open-system)
trading. The cap-and-trade system, which has been most commonly em-
braced, is a traditional model. The regulator allocates (either manually or
by auction) allowances to the emitters, respecting individual caps and an
aggregate limitation. The emitters then calculate the most cost-effective
combination of emitting and trading for new allowances. An alternative
to this system is the cap-and-credit model, which establishes a baseline
performance standard based on the regulator’s choice environmental cal-
culus (usually the aggregate emissions budget or cap divided by total heat
input or capital stock utilization). Players below this baseline are awarded
credit; players above are charged. The ease of adjusting this baseline lends
this system flexibility, but also creates an added element of uncertainty.
Defining a cap-and-trade market is a more sophisticated exercise,
however, than simply structuring allowance distribution. Other essential
considerations are defining pollutants, market coverage, the trading pop-
ulation, the emissions cap (in a mathematical fashion), and the charac-
teristics of the offset as a tradable commodity. Beyond this, an effective
cap-and-trade market must contemplate commodity pricing and the costs
associated with trading, program enforcement and monitoring, and the
program’s own place in an evolving culture of environmental regulation.
The answers to some of these questions require the sort of calculus that
only the well-positioned and well-informed can reliably make, but we can
speculate as to how MLB would address these problems and incorporate
realistic answers into our analysis.
Rate-based trading offers emitters the option to exclude them-
selves from emissions trading, instead submitting to traditional control
regulation. For market players, this frees them of the costs associated
with creating, selling, or buying tradable credit—including the price of
calculating marginal control expenditures, finding and negotiating with
other traders, and receiving government verification of emissions trans-
actions. In turn, this system imposes on the government the practical
obligation of verifying that each proposed emissions reduction credit is
permanent, quantifiable, and genuinely surplus. These processes, natu-
rally, create their own costs. This approach is perhaps most effective as
a concession to the frequent political reality of compromise: while cap-
and-trade markets are in theory almost always preferable, those markets
depend on thorough and productive negotiation and both cooperation and
compliance from many parties. Offering parties an opt-out is an effective
means of achieving agreement, if nothing else. Self-interested parties
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will often prefer the greater flexibility this model affords. In other words,
it is better to have some emissions trading than no emissions trading. As
a corollary to this idea, the rate-based approach can serve as an effective
stepping stone to a more effective cap-and-trade market. It has been
argued, for example, that the complexity of a cap-and-trade market is
such that the most responsible approach is to ease into it gradually with
a rate-based approach, thus reducing the costs of the inevitably inaccu-
rate startup calculations of control emissions caps.
Within the rate-based trading model are two types of credits: emis-
sion reduction credits and discreet emission reduction credits, both of
which offer different approaches to rate-based trading.
Fortunately for our analysis of cap-and-trade and rate-based mar-
kets, examples of these approaches are available for review. In the United
States, four prominent cap-and-trade markets—all with distinct defining
characteristics—have been extensively studied and can provide good in-
sight into what features suit different scenarios best. They range in scale
from metropolitan areas (Chicago and Los Angeles) to seminational and
national size. Rate-based trading markets are also available for review.
One of the unique challenges that MLB presents is its dissociation from
a geographically defined market; the organization is at once national and
isolated. While emissions, obviously, do not observe political boundaries,
markets certainly do—this is the very basis for MLB’s revenue sharing
system. It is, then, to be expected that a market structure designed to
respond even to pollutants that are not geographically specific should
consider the impact of geography on the market.
IV. PROPOSAL
Major League Baseball could adopt a cap-and-trade market to
mitigate carbon emissions without disturbing competitive balance. The
following is this Note’s proposal.
First, MLB should set a baseline emissions standard matching the
best estimations of emissions associated with professional baseball in
2016, the final year of the current CBA. From this baseline, MLB should
set diminishing reductions in 2025, 2035, and 2045, reflecting a cost-
benefit analysis of MLB’s financial interests and the costs associated with
decreasing emissions. Recommendations suggest, for example, a reduc-
tion of about fifteen percent by 2025, fifty percent by 2035, and seventy-
five percent by 2045.167
167 Keohane, supra note 87, at 6.
2014] MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND THE GREEN REVOLUTION 731
Second, MLB should address the revenue sharing issue. Redefining
“Net Local Revenue”168 as excluding a flat percentage costs associated with
emissions reductions would incentivize larger market teams, who natu-
rally create more emissions, to invest more in reductions. Alternatively,
adjusting Performance Factors169 to consider emissions credits could ac-
complish this goal (although the discrepancy between shared revenue
refunds to paying teams versus large market teams might create a gap
in incentives for teams like the Nationals in such a case).170 With these
provisions in place, environmental control will be subsumed in the revenue
sharing program. It will be essential that MLB establish close monitoring
to ensure that emissions credits’ written-off revenue sharing obligations
are accurately claimed. Also, MLB should refrain from allowing teams to
defray all of their emissions mitigation costs through revenue sharing,
as this would disincentivize them from pursuing maximum reductions.
Third, MLB should set up a cap-and-trade market designed to
function in tandem with the integrated revenue sharing program. The
first step in establishing that market is to devise a system for allocating
emissions allowances. The Coase Theorem stipulates that auctioning off
the allowances or distributing them freely both yield the same result.171
Under the former method, the auction funds should be channeled into
the revenue sharing fund defraying reductions costs (that is, either the
Net Local Revenue fund or the Supplemental fund, depending on which
approach MLB opts to take). Under a free distribution, the revenue shar-
ing will happen automatically.
Finally, MLB should also open up the market to external brokers.
This will minimize any deleterious effects on market efficiency due to the
small market size and the franchises’ competitive nature.172 Emissions
offsets groups, while they would have no reason to participate in the
MLB carbon allowances market, could compete against the professional
clubs to keep those allowances available at marginal cost.
This system offers several key benefits. First, it maintains equity
among franchises of all sizes. Franchises will inevitably trade from large
markets to small markets, contributing to the revenue sharing process
rather than compromising it (as in a system where centralized control
left overburdened teams on their own to meet guidelines).
168 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 18, at 120.
169 Id. at 122.
170 See Thurm, supra note 48.
171 See generally Coase, supra note 142.
172 KOSOBUD ET AL., supra note 82, at 25.
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Second, it is easy. This system is as minimally resource-intensive
as is likely feasible. The Coase Theorem guarantees efficiency in market
transactions of this kind.173 Even if this is only a theorem—and not a
practical guarantee—this relatively sophisticated market benefitting
from strong executive oversight and exposure to external brokers seems
capable of maintaining efficient dealing.
Third, such a program offers continued legal independence from
government regulation. MLB has been the beneficiary of independence
from government oversight, especially in the anti-trust realm, for years.174
This is perhaps largely because it has proven more progressive than the
government itself, and American society at large.175 Recent rumblings of
the value emissions trading markets could have in the United States sug-
gest that regulation may come sooner rather than later, and the increas-
ing role of local government in influencing franchises’ motivations has
shown that an efficient mode of normalizing environmental obligations
may soon be in order.
CONCLUSION
Major League Baseball has long been a guiding force, ushering
Americans into new eras of social consensus. As it approaches the precipice
of dramatic new trends in environmental policy, the League’s primary
directive of competitive parity must remain its chief goal. Over the past
century, baseball has come from a loose association of disorganized
leagues to a tightly run business governed under a carefully negotiated
CBA. A cap-and-trade emissions market can fit within the League’s reve-
nue sharing structure, allow teams to aggregate the burden of conformity
to environmental regulations within that agreement, and not only ease
the League’s transition into a new period of eco-awareness, but do so
without relinquishing the balance over a century of law and tradition
have developed.
173 See generally Coase, supra note 142.
174 See Nathanson, supra note 6, at 581–82.
175 See LAMB, supra note 24.
